

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01209 01 OF 02 041728Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----041737Z 130023 /41

O P 041630Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5791
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1209

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, PINR, US
SUBJECT: CYPRUS NEGOTIATION: CONVERSATION WITH DENKTASH

REF: (A) NICOSIA 1206, (B) STATE 098395, (C) NICOSIA 1174,
(D) STATE 091864, (E) USUN 1197

SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MAY 3, DENKTASH SPOKE
OF US CYPRUS POLICY IN INTEMPERATE GENERALITIES. HOWEVER,
HE RECEIVED US THOUGHTS REGARDING SUBSTANCE OF RESUMED
NEGOTIATION WITH SERIOUS ALTHOUGH NONCONCOMMITTAL MODERATION
(BY CONTRAST WITH PAPADOPOULOS). HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT, ON
INSTRUCTION FROM ANKARA, HE AND NOT NEGOTIATOR ONAN WOULD BE
GOING TO ISLAMIC FONMINISTERS CONFERENCE IN LIBYA, AND ONAN
WILL BE READY FOR RESUMED NEGOTIATION IN NICOSIA IN THE
THIRD WEEK OF MAY. END SUMMARY.

1. I CALLED ON DENKTASH LATE MAY 3 SOME HOURS AFTER DCM'S
PREPARATORY MEETING WITH CHELIK (REF A). ON DEPT'S SUGGESTION
(REF B), I TOOK NO "PAPER."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01209 01 OF 02 041728Z

2. I OPENED WITH THE COMMENT THAT USG UNDERSTANDS MAJOR
NEGOTIATING PROGRESS IS UNLIKELY UNTIL AFTER TURKISH ELECTIONS
AND FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, WE THINK THERE
ARE MATTERS WHICH THE NEGOTIATORS CAN USEFULLY DISCUSS IN THE
MEANTIME. WE HAVE WANTED TO SEE THE PARTIES MEET VIENNA
COMMITMENT TO RESUMPTION IN MID-MAY AND TO SUSTAINED
MEGOTIATION. WE HAVE DEVELOPED SOME INFORMAL THOUGHTS THAT

MIGHT HELP PUT MEAT ON THE BONES OF RESUMED NEGOTIATION.

3. BEFORE I COULD PROCEED, DENKTASH INTERJECTED, "YOU HAVE WON BUT YOU ARE WRONG." HE SAID CHELIK WOULD BE GOING TO THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF ISLAMIC FONMINISTERS MEETING IN TRIPOLI AND HE (DENKTASH) WOULD BE ATTENDING THE FINAL PHASE. ONAN WOULD REMAIN IN NICOSIA TO BE AVAILABLE FOR RESUMPTION DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF MAY.

4. DENKTASH THEN REMARKED ANGRILY, "WHAT MAKES YOU THINK I WILL ALWAYS OBEY WHEN YOU PUT THE PRESSURE ON ANKARA?" HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE COULD REFUSE AND UPSET EVERYONE'S LITTLE APPLE CARTS IF HE CHOSE. HE CONTINUED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE FOLLOWING THEMES: BLATANT US PRESSURES ON TURKEY, PARTICULARLY THE US POSITION THAT THE DCA WILL NEVER PASS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CYPRUS SOLUTION, WILL FRUSTRATE SUCH A SOLUTION. THE ONLY LONG-TERM RESULT WILL BE TO WEAKEN MODERATE FORCES IN TURKEY, BRING IN THE COMMUNISTS AND PUSH TURKEY OUT OF NATO. IF TURKEY KNUCKLES UNDER TO THE US AND PUTS PRESSURE ON HIM AND HE COMPLIES, HE WILL BE OUSTED BY THE LEFT WING HERE. TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE TREATED AS UNRECOGNIZED EXILES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THERE HAD TO BE EQUAL INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. HIS OWN PREFERENCE WAS IMMEDIATE UDI. HOW WOULD WE REACT TO THAT? ULTIMATE RESULT OF FOREIGN INTRUSION IN CYPRUS NEGOTIATION WILL BE A "CRETE" SOLUTION IN WHICH TURKISH CYPRIOTS BECOME EXTINCT.

5. WHEN DENKTASH HAD RUN OUT OF STEAM, I OBSERVED THAT THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01209 01 OF 02 041728Z

WAS GROUND WE HAD THOROUGHLY COVERED BEFORE. AS HE WAS AWARE, I DID NOT AGREE WITH HIM ABOUT THE AMERICAN ROLE. WE WERE NOT TRYING TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION, AS HE HAD ASSERTED, BUT TO BE HELPFUL. A CYPRUS SOLUTION WAS AS MUCH IN HIS INTEREST AS IN OURS. OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVE WAS TO RESTORE A FULL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND TURKEY AND, THEREBY THE STRENGTH OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE ALLIANCE. AN UNRESOLVED CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS AN IMPEDIMENT. WE DO NOT REGARD THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP AS IN THRALL TO ANKARA. WE DO BELIEVE THAT EVERYONE MUST CONTRIBUTE IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS, AND WE THEREFORE ADDRESS OURS
LVES TO ANKARA
AND ATHENS AS WELL AS TO THE PARTIES ON THE ISLAND. OUR VIEWS ON UDI ARE WELL-KNOWN. IT WOULD HURT BOTH TURKEY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. LATTER WOULD LOSE THE GROUND THEY HAVE GAINED OVER THE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL HEARING FOR AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR CONCERNS. I PARTICULARLY COULD NOT AGREE THAT TURKS IN CYPRUS WOULD GO THE PATH OF CRETE. 1974 HAD REVERSED THE SITUATION ON THE ISLAND. POWER WAS

NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE TURKS. IT WAS THE GREEKS WHO CONSTANTLY EXPRESSED TO ME THEIR FEAR THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE ELIMINATION OF THEIR PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01209 02 OF 02 041748Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----041759Z 130336 /42

O P 041630Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5792
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1209

EXDIS

6. I THEN CONVEYED TO DENKTASH US THOUGHTS, STRESSING AGAIN THEIR INFORMAL NATURE AND PURPOSE, THE LATTER BEING TO STIMULATE PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. DENKTASH TOOK NOTES AND AFTERWARDS SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THESE "USEFUL IDEAS." WHAT CHELIK HAD TOLD HIM AFTER HIS WASHINGTON VISIT HAD BEEN LESS PRECISE. HE ASKED WHAT WE WERE SUGGESTING TO THE GREEK SIDE AND I TOLD HIM. I SAID I WOULD BE SEEING ONAN LATER IN THE WEEK AND WOULD DISCUSS THE SAME THOUGHTS WITH HIM. DENKTASH ASKED THAT I HOLD OFF UNTIL AT LEAST MAY 6, AS HE WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT ONAN'S REACTIONS REFLECTED A CAREFULLY CONSIDERED VIEW.

7. REFERRING TO CLIFFORD'S APR 29 LETTER, DENKTASH ASKED IF MR. CLIFFORD WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM HIM. I SAID HE COULD BE SURE THAT MR. CLIFFORD WOULD ALWAYS BE HAPPY TO HEAR FROM HIM, PARTICULARLY IF THE SUBSTANCE WERE POSITIVE. DENKTASH OBSERVED THAT SOMETIMES IT WAS NECESSARY TO "APPROACH THE POSITIVE THROUGH THE NEGATIVE." MR. CLIFFORD, I NOTED, WAS ALREADY WELL ACQUAINTED WITH DENKTASH'S NEGATIVE VIEWS.

8. COMMENT: FOLLOWING FOREGOING CONVERSATION WITH DENKTASH, I WAS IN TOUCH WITH DE CUELLAR TO TELL HIM ABOUT THE TURKISH SHIFT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01209 02 OF 02 041748Z

ON ONAN AND RESUMPTION. HE WAS VERY PLEASED. WITH THIS IN HAND BUT NOT CITED SPECIFICALLY, HE WILL PICK UP HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DENKTASH AND ONAN AIRMING FOR AN INITIAL MEETING ON MAY 19. WE AGREE THIS IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE IT COMES CLOSER TO FULFILLING THE MID-MAY COMMITMENT AND THEREBY MEETING GREEK CYPRIOT (PAPADOPOULOS) COMPLAINTS THAT THEIR SIDE CANNOT LEND ITSELF TO A CHARADE IF THE TURKS INSIST ON NO MORE THAN ONE OR TWO SYMBOLIC MEETINGS AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

9. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH ONAN FOR AFTERNOON MAY 6.

10. I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM STRASBOURG OVER THE WEEKEND. HE TELLS ME PAPADOPOULOS CONTINUES TO BE AGGRESSIVELY HOSTILE TOWARD US SUGGESTIONS. HE IS MAKING A PARTICULAR FUSS OVER THE TWO-LINE MAP, SAYING THE SECOND LINE SHOULD NOT BE THE TURKISH FORWARD DEMARCATION LINE, BUT A NEW LINE DRAWN BY DENKTASH ON THE BASIS OF HIS ACCEPTANCE (WITH MAKARIOS) OF 32.8 PERCENT AS THE TURK'S TERRITORIAL STARTING POINT. I TOLD CHRISTOPHIDES I THOUGHT PAPADOPOULOS WAS MAKING TOO MUCH OF AN ISSUE. US THOUGHTS DID NOT TAPE POSITIONS THAT HAD TO BE ARGUED POINT BY POINT. THEY WERE INFORMAL IDEAS INTENDED TO BE HELPFUL IN STIMULATING DISCUSSION.

11. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH DE CUELLAR, PAPADOPOULOS HAD MADE THE SAME POINT ABOUT THE MAP. HE HAS IMPLIED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF US SUGGESTIONS WOULD ENTAIL POLICY DECISION WHICH GO BEYOND HIS EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS AND WHICH HE CANNOT GET, GIVEN MAKARIOS' ILLNESS.

12. WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN DEPT'S INTEREST IN GREEK CYPRIOT TRANSCRIPT OF APRIL 4 SESSION IN VIENNA, NOR HAS PAPADOPOULOS GONE BACK ON HIS PROMISE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT HE HAS SIMPLY NOT HAD TIME TO PUT MRS. SOULIOTI'S NOTES IN FINAL FORM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01209 02 OF 02 041748Z

CRAWFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 04-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977NICOSI01209
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770156-0758
Format: TEL
From: NICOSIA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770595/aaaadejn.tel
Line Count: 217
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 63588c9a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 77 NICOSIA 1206, 77 STATE 98395, 77 NICOSIA 1174, 77 STATE 91864, 77 USUN NEW YORK 1197
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2644834
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS NEGOTIATION: CONVERSATION WITH DENKTASH
TAGS: PFOR, PINR, CY, US, (DENKTASH, RAUF), (CRAWFORD, WILLIAM R JR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/63588c9a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009